MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3(5-6)/1997

On some problems of control over compliance with the procedure for the use of airspace

Colonel GeneralV.F.MIGUNOV,

candidate of military sciences

Colonel A.A. GORYACHEV

The STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over its territory and territorial waters. Use of airspace Russian Federation regulated by laws that are consistent with international standards, as well as legal documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.

To organize the rational use of the airspace of the country, control air traffic, ensuring flight safety, monitoring compliance with the procedure for its use, the Unified Air Traffic Control System (EU ATC) was created. Formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of the airspace, are part of the control objects of this system and are guided in their activities by uniform regulatory documents for all. At the same time, readiness to repel a sudden attack by an air enemy is ensured not only by the continuous study by the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces of the developing situation, but also by the exercise of control over the procedure for using airspace. The question is legitimate: is there any duplication of functions here?

Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Among the reasons for this are the differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the volume of their financing, the significant size of the territory, departmental disunity.

Air traffic data in the ATC system is used to develop commands transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to identify aircraft that have violated the state border, control troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, direct weapons of destruction and electronic warfare at air targets.

Therefore, the principles of construction of these systems, and hence their capabilities, differ significantly. It is essential that the positions of the EU ATC radar facilities are located along the airways and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m. Air defense radio engineering units are located primarily along state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum flight altitude of potential enemy aircraft.

The system of control of the Air Defense Forces over the procedure for using airspace took shape in the 1960s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, intelligence and information centers (RIC) of the command posts of formations, associations and the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command posts of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely detection of aircraft whose ownership has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft that violate the procedure for using airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation flights; assistance to EU ATC authorities in assisting aircraft in force majeure circumstances, as well as search and rescue services.

Monitoring the use of airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and air traffic control: radar consists in escorting aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics with the help of radar facilities; control room - in determining the estimated location of aircraft on the basis of the plan (applications for flights, traffic schedules) and reports of actual flights, . coming to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC and departmental control points in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for the use of airspace.

If radar and air traffic control data are available for the aircraft, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous relationship is established between the information obtained by the instrumental method (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the notice of the flight of this object (flight number or application number, side number, starting, intermediate and final points of the route, etc.). If it was not possible to identify the radar information with the planning and dispatching information, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the procedure for using the airspace, data about it are immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures adequate to the situation are taken. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not comply with the controller's instructions, air defense fighters intercept him and escort him to the designated airfield.

Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of the control system, one should first of all mention the insufficient development of the legal framework governing the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of Russia's border with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for controlling its crossing was unjustifiably dragged out. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, the clarification of the ownership of an aircraft flying from the side of these states ends when it is already in the depths of the territory of Russia. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense forces on duty is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are being unjustifiably spent and excessive psychological tension is created among combat crew members, which is fraught with the most serious consequences. Partially, this problem is solved as a result of the organization of joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only by replacing the current Regulation on the Procedure for the Use of Airspace with a new one that takes into account the current situation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to a reduction in the number of radio engineering troops and, as a result, the number of units, and in the first place, those of them were disbanded, the maintenance and maintenance of combat duty of which required large material costs. But it was these units, located on the sea coast, on the islands, hills and mountains, that had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support has led to the fact that the remaining units are much more likely than before to lose their combat effectiveness due to the lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the ability of the RTV to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the borders of Russia has significantly decreased.

IN last years the number of airfields (landing sites) having a direct connection with the command posts of the Air Defense Forces closest to them has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights are received via bypass communication channels with large delays or are not received at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, makes it difficult to identify radar and planned dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.

Additional problems arose in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. There are known facts when flights are carried out not only without notification of the Air Defense Forces, but also without the permission of the ATC. At the regional level, there is a disunity of enterprises in the use of airspace. The commercialization of the activities of airlines affects even the presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand their payment, and the troops do not have the means for these purposes. The problem is solved by making unofficial extracts that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over compliance with the established procedure for the use of airspace is declining.

Changes in the structure of air traffic had a certain impact on the quality of the control system. At present, there is a trend towards an increase in international flights and out-of-schedule flights, and, consequently, the congestion of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of the communication channels at the air defense command post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors in receiving notices of planned flights, messages about departures, etc. has sharply increased.

It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially resolved as the Federal Airspace Reconnaissance and Control System develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the integration of departmental radar systems, for the first time it will be possible to use a common information model of air traffic by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of air situation data, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, others departmental air traffic control points.

In the process of theoretical study of options for the use of EARLS, the question arose of the advisability of further entrusting the Air Defense Forces with the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace. After all, the EU ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is enough to carry out control only by the EU ATC centers, which, having direct contact with aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transfer to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces a large amount of planning and dispatching information and further identification of radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.

However, the Air Defense Forces, being on guard of the air borders of the state, in the matter of identifying aircraft that violate the state border, cannot rely solely on the EU ATC. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and at the EU ATC centers minimizes the probability of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.

There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order for the long term: the disciplinary influence of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zonal EU ATC center, but also by the calculation of the control group of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization contributes to the prompt detection of violations of the procedure for the use of airspace and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on flight safety, but practice shows a direct relationship between the reliability of control and the level of safety.

In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, objectively, there is a danger of destroying previously created and well-established systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major state tasks as border protection and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, maintaining the combat effectiveness of the radio engineering troops, which form the basis of the Federal System for Intelligence and Control of Airspace, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.

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BC/ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M. Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, in the process of their development began to have a long range of 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The low visibility of such targets during the flight requires their detection and identification on the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to fix such a target at a long distance, either by over-the-horizon radar stations (OG radars), or using satellite-based radar or optical systems.

Attack drones and cruise missiles fly most often at speeds close to those of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as normal air traffic. This puts before the airspace control systems the task of detecting and identifying such means of attack from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by means of VKS. To solve this problem, it is necessary to apply all existing and developed airspace control and surveillance systems, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

Launch of a cruise missile or strike unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo tube of a patrol boat, from the external load of an aircraft or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container, located on a civilian dry cargo ship, car trailer, railway platform. The satellites of the missile attack warning system already today record and track the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean using the engine torch in the acceleration section. Consequently, the satellites of the missile attack warning system need to monitor not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The placement of radar systems on satellites to control the aerospace space today is associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control the airspace via satellites. Information from commercial aircraft using the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and repeaters of the received information to ground airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic surveillance of the planet's airspace. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft over fairly large areas.

Airspace information coming from ADS-B system receivers located on satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over oceans and in terrain folds mountain ranges continents. This information will allow us to isolate the means of air attack from the flow of commercial aircraft with their subsequent identification.

ADS-B identification information on commercial aircraft coming through satellites will create an opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aviation accident sites in the ocean far from the coast.

Let us evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems for receiving aircraft flight information using the ADS-B system and relaying this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information using the ADS-B system using on-board transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. The transmitters of the ADS-B system located on board the aircraft have limited power, therefore, the receivers located on board the satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Samolet-Sputnik satellite communication line, we can estimate the maximum range at which the satellite can receive information from aircraft. The peculiarity of the used satellite line is the restrictions on the weight, overall dimensions and power consumption of both the onboard transponder of the aircraft and the onboard satellite repeater.

To determine the maximum range at which it is possible to receive messages by the ADS-B satellite, we will use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems on the ground-satellite section:

Where

is the effective signal power at the transmitter output ;

is the effective signal power at the receiver input;

– transmitting antenna gain;

– slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving AP;

-wavelength on the line "DOWN"

waves on the "Down" line;

is the effective aperture area of ​​the transmitting antenna;

is the transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the SC antenna;

– efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the ES antenna;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute in the formula the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the receiving trunk of the satellite. As calculations show, the maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is 2256 km. Such a slant transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is possible only when operating through low-orbit constellations of satellites. At the same time, we use standard aircraft equipment without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly smaller restrictions on weight and dimensions than the onboard equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receivers and high gain antennas. Therefore, the communication range on the satellite-to-ground link depends only on the conditions of the line of sight of the satellite.

Using data from the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant range of communication between a satellite and a ground receiving station using the formula:

,

where H is the height of the satellite orbit;

is the radius of the Earth's surface.

The results of calculations of the maximum slant range for points at different geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

The maximum transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-to-ground link of the Orbkom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum data slant range is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range for the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace surveillance system using satellite relaying of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based flight information processing centers. Such a surveillance system will increase the range of controlled space from a ground station to 4,500 kilometers without the use of inter-satellite communications, which will increase the airspace control area. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 "Airspace control using satellites"

Fig. 2 "Airspace control with inter-satellite communication"

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

Expand the coverage area of ​​the airspace control system, including the waters of the oceans and the territory of mountain ranges up to 4500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an inter-satellite communication system, it is possible to control the airspace of the Earth globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace surveillance systems;

Select air objects tracked by the overhead radar according to the degree of their danger at the far detection lines.

Literature:

1. Fedosov E.A. "Half a century in aviation". M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Edited by L.Ya.Kantor. M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. “Order of the Federal Air Transport Service of the Russian Federation dated October 14, 1999 No. No. 80 "On the creation and implementation of a system of broadcasting automatic dependent surveillance in civil aviation Russia".

4. Traskovsky A. "Moscow's aviation mission: the basic principle of safe management." "Aviapanorama". 2008. No. 4.

of these Federal Rules

144. Control over compliance with the requirements of these Federal Rules is carried out by the Federal Air Transport Agency, air traffic services (flight control) in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft violating the procedure for using the airspace (hereinafter referred to as violating aircraft) and aircraft violating the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. If the air traffic services (flight control) body detects a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense body and the aircraft commander, if radio contact is established with him.

146. Air defense agencies provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:

a) threatening illegal crossing or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) being unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting a distress signal;

e) flying letters "A" and "K";

f) performing flights for search and rescue operations.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) the use of airspace without the permission of the relevant center of the Unified System under the permit procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in clause 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) non-compliance with the conditions brought by the center of the Unified System in the permit for the use of airspace;

c) non-compliance with the commands of the air traffic services (flight control) and the commands of the duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) non-compliance with the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) non-compliance with the established temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

f) flight of a group of aircraft in excess of the number specified in the flight plan of the aircraft;

g) use of the airspace of a prohibited zone, a restricted flight zone without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unplanned (undeclared) aerodrome (site), except for cases of forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services (flight control) authority;

i) non-compliance by the aircraft crew with the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (with the exception of cases of occurrence on board the aircraft emergency requiring an immediate change in profile and flight mode);

(see text in previous edition)

j) unauthorized deviation of the air traffic service (flight control) body outside the boundaries of the air route, local air route and route, except in cases where such deviation is due to flight safety considerations (bypassing dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) entry of an aircraft into controlled airspace without the permission of the air traffic services (flight control) authority;

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notifying the air traffic services unit.

148. When an intruder aircraft is detected, the air defense authorities give the “Mode” signal, which means the requirement to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

The air defense authorities bring the "Regime" signal to the appropriate centers of the Unified System and take action to stop the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the intruder aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the "Regime" signal given by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the offending aircraft has stopped violating the procedure for its use, is taken by:

a) the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along air traffic services routes;

b) chiefs of duty shifts of the regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along air traffic service routes;

c) the operational duty officer of the air defense body - in other cases.

(see text in previous edition)

150. On the decision made in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules, the centers of the Unified System and the air defense authorities notify each other, as well as the user of the airspace.

(see text in previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, using weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against an intruder aircraft, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases, the air defense authorities give the signal "Carpet" , meaning the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the corresponding area of ​​​​all aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft involved in the fight against intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue tasks.

(see text in previous edition)

The air defense authorities bring the "Carpet" signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of ​​operation of the specified signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System immediately take measures to withdraw aircraft (their landing) from the coverage area of ​​the "Carpet" signal.

(see text in previous edition)

152. If the crew of the offending aircraft fails to comply with the command of the air traffic services (flight control) body to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense bodies. The air defense authorities apply measures to the intruder aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to obey the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

In case of compulsion to land an intruder aircraft, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing site) suitable for landing of this type of aircraft.

153. In the event of a threat to flight safety, including that associated with an act of unlawful interference on board an aircraft, the crew gives a distress signal. On aircraft equipped with a hazard signaling system, in the event of an attack on the crew, the "CCO" signal is additionally given. Upon receipt of the "Distress" and (or) "SSO" signal from the crew of the aircraft, the air traffic services (flight control) bodies are obliged to take the necessary measures to provide assistance to the crew in distress and immediately transfer to the centers of the Unified System, aviation coordination search centers and rescue, as well as to the air defense authorities, data on his whereabouts and other necessary information.

154. After clarification of the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission for the further operation of an international flight or a flight associated with the crossing of more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the shift on duty of the main center of the Unified System, and in other cases - the heads of shifts on duty of the zonal center of the Unified System systems.

The invention relates to the field of radar and can be used in the development of advanced radars. Achievable technical result is to increase the reliability of object detection. To do this, in the well-known method of controlling the airspace, which consists in reviewing it with the help of a radar, they additionally receive the reflected energy of an external radio-electronic means (RES), determine the boundaries of the zone in which the ratio of the energy of the RES reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value, and the radar signal is emitted only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected.

The invention relates to the field of radar and can be used in the development of advanced radars. To ensure airspace control, it is necessary to detect an object with high reliability and measure its coordinates with the required accuracy. There is a known method for detecting an object using passive multi-position systems that use the irradiation of an object due to the energy of external radio electronic means (RES), such as television centers or even sources of a natural nature: lightning, the sun, some stars. Detection of an object and measurement of its coordinates in this method is carried out by receiving the energy (signals) of external sources reflected by the object at spaced points and joint processing of the received signals. The advantage of this method is that its operation does not require the expenditure of energy to irradiate the object. In addition, it is known that the effective scattering area of ​​an object with bistatic transmission radar in the zone of existence of the transmission effect is 3-4 orders of magnitude larger compared to monostatic. This means that an object can be detected when it is irradiated by a relatively low energy level of the RES. The disadvantages of the method are as follows: - to implement the method, it is necessary to have several spaced receiving positions with a communication system between them, since if there is one position, only a sign of the presence of an object can be detected, and at least three are needed to measure its coordinates; - only RES with a signal having a spectrum width sufficient to ensure the resolution of objects in range can be used; - it is impossible to ensure the control of the entire space when using RES with a real energy potential, because it is impossible to provide the required ratio of the RES energy reflected by the object / noise at an arbitrary position of the object in the controlled space, since, as shown in (graphs in Fig. 3, p. 426), the transmission effect operates at diffraction angles of approximately 6 degrees. The closest technical solution is a method for monitoring airspace using a radar, when a probing signal is emitted sequentially in all directions of the controlled space and, according to the signal received by the reflected object, it is detected and its coordinates are measured. As a rule, a radar with a needle-shaped antenna pattern in the S-band is used for this, for example, the RAT-31S radar (Radioelectronics abroad, 1980, 17, p. 23). The disadvantage of this method is that even with a needle beam, the energy concentration when viewing each direction is insufficient to detect an inconspicuous object, since in a short viewing period (several seconds) it is required to examine the controlled space, consisting of thousands of directions. This reduces the reliability of object detection. It can be increased by increasing the concentration of energy in the examined direction by increasing the potential of the radar. For mobile radars, this is not possible. An increase in the concentration of energy in the examined direction while maintaining energy can be achieved by reducing the number of inspection directions, which is also not possible, because shortcuts will get out of hand. The present invention is aimed at solving the problem of increasing the reliability of object detection while maintaining the energy potential of the radar. The problem is solved by reducing the number of inspection directions with the help of radar in those areas of space, when the object is located, reliable reception of the energy of external RES reflected by it is ensured. This result is achieved by the fact that in the known method of airspace control, which consists in its review with the help of a radar, according to the invention, the reflected energy of an external radio electronic means (RES) is additionally received, the boundaries of the zone are determined in which the ratio of the RES energy reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value , and emit a radar signal only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected. The essence of the invention is as follows. A specific RES with known parameters is determined, the energy of which will be used to detect an object (for example, a television, communications satellite or ground-based RES). The value of the ratio of the energy of the RES reflected by the object / noise (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio) at the reception point is determined by the formula (LZ, formula 1, p. 425): where Q= P C /P W - signal-to-noise ratio; P T - average power of the RES transmitter; G T , G R are the gains of the transmitting and receiving antennas, respectively; - wavelength; - generalized losses; ( B , Г)) - RCS of the object for a two-position system as a function of the diffraction angles B and Г; F(,) F(,) - DN of transmitting and receiving antennas; R W - average noise power in the band of the receiving device, taking into account the detection threshold; R T , R R - distance from the RES and the receiving device to the object, respectively. For a Q value exceeding the threshold value, i.e. providing the required reliability of detection of the RES energy reflected by the object, the boundary values ​​B , Г are determined, which are taken as the boundaries of the zone, when the object is located in which the ratio of the RES energy reflected by the object / noise is greater than the threshold value. In the case of using a stable operating RES, the zone where Q exceeds the threshold value can be determined experimentally by collecting statistics when reviewing the zone simultaneously in the passive mode and using the radar. At the same time, the boundaries of the zone are determined, in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected with the required reliability by the object detected by the radar. After determining the boundaries, the zone is inspected in a passive mode using a receiving antenna in the frequency range of the selected REF in a known way (see, for example,), the radar is not used to view this zone. upon detection in a certain direction o , o , entering the zone, the energy of the RES reflected by the object, they decide to detect in this direction a sign of the location of the object and emit a radar signal in this direction, in the active mode they detect the object and measure its coordinates. Thus, the number of directions surveyed by the radar will be reduced; due to this, the concentration of radar energy can be increased when examining the directions of space, which will increase the reliability of object detection. It should be noted that the energy of the external RES in the present invention is used only to detect a sign of the presence of an object, in contrast, for example, to the method described in where it is used to detect an object and measure its coordinates. This eliminates the main disadvantages of the method of using an external RES, noted in , and reduces the requirements for the radiation parameters of the RES.

Claim

A method for monitoring airspace, which consists in its review with the help of a radar, characterized in that it additionally receives the energy of an external radio-electronic means (RES) reflected by an object, determines the boundaries of the zone in which the ratio of the RES energy reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value, and emits a radar signal only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected.

Other changes related to registered inventions

Changes: The transfer of the exclusive right was registered without concluding an agreement Date and number of the state registration of the transfer of the exclusive right: 03/12/2010 / RP0000606 Patent holder: Open Joint Stock Company "Scientific Research Institute of Measuring Instruments"
Former patent holder: Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Research Institute of Measuring Instruments"

Number and year of publication of the bulletin: 30-2003

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SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY No. 1/2007, pp. 28-33

UDC 621.396.96

THEM. ANOSHKIN,

Head of Department of the Scientific Research Institute

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,

Candidate of Technical Sciences, Senior Researcher

The principles of construction are given and the capabilities of advanced multi-position air defense radar systems are evaluated, which will allow the armed forces of the United States and its allies to solve qualitatively new tasks of covert surveillance and airspace control.

The constant growth of requirements for the volume and quality of radar information about the air and interference situation, ensuring high security of information assets from the effects of enemy electronic warfare forces foreign military specialists not only to look for new technical solutions in the creation of various components of radar stations (RLS), which are the main information sensors in air defense systems, air traffic control, etc., but also to develop new non-traditional areas in this field of development and creation military equipment.

One of these promising areas is multi-position radar. Research and development carried out by the United States and a number of NATO countries (Great Britain, France, Germany) in this area are aimed at improving the information content, noise immunity and survivability of radar facilities and systems for various purposes through the use of bistatic and multi-position modes of operation in their work. In addition, it provides reliable monitoring of low-observable air targets (ATs), including cruise missiles and aircraft manufactured using the Stealth technology, operating under conditions of electronic and fire suppression by the enemy, as well as reflections from the underlying surface and local items. A multi-position radar system (MPRS) should be understood as a set of transmitting and receiving points that ensure the creation of a radar field with the required parameters. The basis of the MPRS (as its separate cells) are bistatic radars as part of a transmitter - receiver, spaced apart in space. When the transmitters are turned off, such a system, in the presence of appropriate communication lines between receiving points, can operate in a passive mode, determining the coordinates of objects emitting electromagnetic waves.

To ensure increased secrecy of the operation of such systems in combat conditions, various principles of their construction are considered: ground, air, space and mixed basing options that use probing radiation from standard radars, enemy active jammers, as well as radio engineering systems (Fig. 1), unconventional for radar (television and radio broadcasting transmitting stations, various systems and means of communication, etc.). The most intensive work in this direction is carried out in the United States.

The ability to have a radar field system that coincides with the coverage field formed by the illumination zones of television, radio broadcasting transmitting stations (RTPS), cellular telephone base stations, etc., is due to the fact that the height of their antenna towers can reach 50 ... 250 m , and the omnidirectional illumination zone formed by them is pressed against the surface of the earth. The simplest recalculation using the line-of-sight range formula shows that aircrafts, flying at extremely low altitudes, fall into the field of illumination of such transmitters, starting from a distance of 50 - 80 km.

Unlike combined (monostatic) radars, the detection zone of MPRS targets, in addition to the energy potential and radar surveillance conditions, largely depends on the geometry of their construction, the number and relative position of transmitting and receiving points. The concept of "maximum detection range" here is a value that cannot be unambiguously determined by the energy potential, as is the case for combined radars. The maximum detection range of the EC of a bistatic radar as a unit cell of the MPRS is determined by the shape of the Cassini oval (lines of constant signal-to-noise ratios), which corresponds to a family of isodality curves or lines of constant total ranges (ellipses) that determine the position of the target on the oval (Fig. 2) in in accordance with the expression

The radar equation for determining the maximum range of a bistatic radar is

Where rl,r2 - distances from the transmitter to the target and from the target to the receiver;

Pt- transmitter power, W;

G t, GT- gains of the transmitting and receiving antennas;

Pmin - limiting sensitivity of the receiving device;

k- Boltzmann's constant;

v1, v2 - loss coefficients during propagation of radio waves on the way from the transmitter to the target and from the target to the receiver.

The area of ​​the detection zone of the MPRS, consisting of one transmitting and several receiving points (or vice versa), can significantly exceed the area of ​​the detection zone of an equivalent combined radar.

It should be noted that the value of the effective scattering area (ESR) in a bistatic radar for the same target differs from its RCS measured in a single-position radar. When it approaches the base line (transmitter-receiver line) L there is an effect of a sharp increase in RCS (Fig. 3), and the maximum value of the latter is observed when the target is on the base line and is determined by the formula

Where A - cross-sectional area of ​​the object, perpendicular to the direction of propagation of radio waves, m;

λ - wavelength, m.

The use of this effect makes it possible to more effectively detect low-profile targets, including those made using the Stealth technology. A multi-position radar system can be implemented on the basis of various options for the geometry of its construction using both mobile and stationary reception points.

The concept of MPRS has been developed in the United States since the early 1950s in the interest of using them to solve various problems, primarily the control of aerospace. The work carried out was mainly theoretical, and in some cases experimental. Interest in multi-position radar systems arose again in the late 1990s with the advent of high-performance computers and complex signal processing tools (radar, jamming, radio and television transmitting station signals, radio signals of stations mobile communications etc.), capable of processing large amounts of radar information to achieve acceptable accuracy characteristics of such systems. In addition, the advent of the GPS (Global Position System) space radio navigation system makes it possible to perform accurate topographical positioning and tight time synchronization of MPRS elements, which is a necessary condition for signal correlation processing in such systems. Radar characteristics of signals emitted by television (TV) and frequency modulated (FM) broadcasting transmitting stations with radiotelephone stations of cellular GSM communication are shown in Table 1.

The main characteristic of radio signals from the point of view of their use in radar systems is their uncertainty function (time-frequency mismatch function or the so-called "uncertainty body"), which determines the resolution in terms of delay time (range) and Doppler frequency (radial velocity). In general, it is described by the following expression

On fig. Figures 4-5 show the uncertainty functions of television image and sound signals, VHF FM radio signals, and digital broadband audio broadcasting signals.

As follows from the analysis of the above dependences, the uncertainty function of the TV image signal has a multi-peak character, due to its frame and line periodicity. The continuous nature of the TV signal makes it possible to carry out frequency selection of echo signals with high accuracy, however, the presence of frame periodicity in it leads to the appearance of interfering components in its mismatch function, following after 50 Hz. A change in the average brightness of the transmitted TV image leads to a change in the average radiation power and a change in the level of the main and side peaks of its time-frequency mismatch function. An important advantage of the TV sound signal and frequency-modulated VHF broadcasting signals is the single-peak nature of their uncertainty bodies, which facilitates the resolution of echo signals both in terms of delay time and Doppler frequency. However, their nonstationarity over the spectrum width has a strong influence on the shape and width of the central peak of the uncertainty functions.

Such signals in the traditional sense are not intended for solving radar problems, since they do not provide the required resolution and accuracy in determining the coordinates of targets. However, joint real-time processing of signals emitted by various different types of means, reflected from the computer center and simultaneously received at several receiving points, makes it possible to provide the required accuracy characteristics of the system as a whole. To do this, it is planned to use new adaptive algorithms for digital processing of radar information and the use of high-performance computing tools of a new generation.

A feature of MPRS with external target illumination transmitters is the presence of powerful direct (penetrating) transmitter signals, the level of which can be 40 - 90 dB higher than the level of signals reflected from targets. To reduce the interfering effect of penetrating transmitter signals and re-reflections from the underlying surface and local objects in order to expand the detection zone, it is necessary to apply special measures: spatial rejection of interfering signals, auto-compensation methods with frequency-selective feedback at high and intermediate frequency, suppression at video frequency, etc.

Despite the fact that work in this direction was carried out over a fairly long period, only recently, after the appearance of relatively inexpensive ultra-fast digital processors that allow processing large amounts of information, for the first time there was a real opportunity to create experimental samples that meet modern tactical and technical requirements.

Over the past fifteen years, specialists from the American company Lockheed Martin have been developing a promising three-coordinate radar system for detecting and tracking air targets based on multi-position construction principles, which was called Silent Sentry.

It has fundamentally new capabilities for covert monitoring of the air situation. The system does not have its own transmitting devices, which makes it possible to work in a passive mode and does not allow the enemy to determine the location of its elements by means of electronic intelligence. The covert use of the Silent Sentry MPRS is also facilitated by the absence of rotating elements and antennas with mechanical scanning of the antenna pattern in its receiving points. As the main sources that provide the formation of probing signals and illumination of targets, continuous signals with amplitude and frequency modulation are used, emitted by television and radio broadcasting ultra-short-wave transmitting stations, as well as signals from other radio equipment located in the coverage area of ​​the system, including air defense and control radars. air traffic, radio beacons, means of navigation, communications, etc. The principles of combat use of the Silent Sentry system are shown in fig. 6.

According to the developers, the system will allow to simultaneously accompany a large number of ATs, the number of which will be limited only by the capabilities of radar information processing devices. At the same time, the throughput of the Silent Sentry system (compared to traditional radar facilities, in which this indicator largely depends on the parameters of the radar antenna system and signal processing devices) will not be limited by the parameters of antenna systems and receiving devices. In addition, compared to conventional radars that provide a detection range of low-flying targets up to 40 - 50 km, the Silent Sentry system will allow them to be detected and tracked at ranges up to 220 km due to a higher power level of signals emitted by television and radio broadcasting transmitters. stations (tens of kilowatts in continuous mode), and by placing their antenna devices on special towers (up to 300 m or more) and natural heights (hills and mountains) to ensure the maximum possible zones of reliable reception of television and radio programs. Their radiation pattern is pressed to the surface of the earth, which also improves the system's ability to detect low-flying targets.

The first experimental sample of the mobile receiving module of the system, which includes four containers with the same type of computing units (0.5X0.5X0.5 m each) and an antenna system (9X2.5 m), was created at the end of 1998. In the case of their serial production, the cost of one receiving module of the system will be, depending on the composition of the means used, from 3 to 5 million dollars.

A stationary version of the receiving module of the Silent Sentry system has also been created, the characteristics of which are given in Table. 2. It uses a larger phased array antenna (PAA) than the mobile version, as well as computing facilities that provide twice the performance of the mobile version. The antenna system is mounted on the side surface of the building, the flat headlight of which is directed to the side international airport them. J.Washington in Baltimore (at a distance of about 50 km from the transmitting point).

The composition of a separate receiving module of a stationary type of the Silent Sentry system includes:

antenna system with phased array (linear or flat) of the target channel, which provides reception of signals reflected from targets;

antennas of "reference" channels, providing reception of direct (reference) signals from target illumination transmitters;

a receiving device with a large dynamic range and systems for suppressing interfering signals from target illumination transmitters;

analog-to-digital converter of radar signals;

a high-performance digital processor for processing radar information manufactured by Silicon Graphics, which provides real-time data output of at least 200 air targets;

air situation display devices;

a background-target environment analysis processor that optimizes the selection at each specific moment of operation of certain types of probing radiation signals and target illumination transmitters located in the system coverage area in order to obtain the maximum signal-to-noise ratio at the output of the radar information processing device;

means of registration, recording and storage of information;

training and simulation equipment;

means of autonomous power supply.

The receiving phased array includes several subarrays developed on the basis of existing types of commercial antenna systems for various ranges and purposes. As experimental samples, conventional television antenna devices are additionally included in it. One PAA receiving cloth is capable of providing a field of view in the azimuth sector up to 105 degrees, and in the elevation sector up to 50 degrees, and the most effective level of reception of signals reflected from targets is provided in the azimuth sector up to 60 degrees. To ensure overlapping of the circular view area in azimuth, it is possible to use several PAR canvases.

The appearance of the antenna systems, the receiving device and the screen of the situation display device of the stationary and mobile versions of the receiving module of the Silent Sentry system is shown in Figure 7. The system was tested in real conditions in March 1999 (Fort Stewart, Georgia). This provided observation (detection, tracking, determination of spatial coordinates, speed and acceleration) in a passive mode for various aerodynamic and ballistic targets.

The main task of further work on the creation of the Silent Sentry system is currently associated with improving its capabilities, in particular, introducing it into the target recognition mode. This problem is partially solved in already created samples, but not in real time. In addition, a version of the system is being worked out, in which it is planned to use airborne radars of early warning and control aircraft as target illumination transmitters.

In the UK, work in the field of multi-position radar systems for this purpose has been carried out since the late 1980s. Various experimental models of bistatic radar systems were developed and deployed, the receiving modules of which were deployed in the area of ​​London Heathrow Airport (Fig. 8). As target illumination transmitters, regular radio and television transmitting stations and air traffic control radars were used. In addition, experimental models of forward-scattering Doppler radars were developed that use the effect of an increase in the RCS of targets as they approach the base line of a bistatic system with television illumination. Research in the field of creating MPRS using radio and television transmitting stations as sources of exposure to CC was carried out at the research institute of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, as reported at a session of leading Norwegian institutions and developers on promising projects for the creation and development of new radio-electronic military equipment and technologies in June 2000 G.

Mobile base stations can also be used as airspace sounding signal sources. cellular communication decimeter wavelength range. Work in this direction to create their own versions of passive radar systems is carried out by specialists from the German company Siemens, the British firms Roke Manor Research and BAE Systems, and the French space agency ONERA.

It is planned to determine the location of the CC by calculating the phase difference of the signals emitted by several base stations, the coordinates of which are known with high accuracy. In this case, the main technical problem is to ensure the synchronization of such measurements within a few nanoseconds. It is supposed to be solved by applying the technologies of highly stable time standards (atomic clocks installed on board spacecraft), developed during the creation of the Navstar space radio navigation system.

Such systems will high level survivability, since during their operation there are no signs of the use of mobile telephone base stations as radar transmitters. If the enemy is somehow able to establish this fact, he will be forced to destroy all transmitters of the telephone network, which seems unlikely, given the current scale of their deployment. It is practically impossible to identify and destroy the receiving devices of such radar systems using technical means, since during their operation they use the signals of a standard mobile telephone network. The use of jammers, according to the developers, will also turn out to be ineffective due to the fact that in the operation of the MPRS options under consideration, a mode is possible in which the REB devices themselves turn out to be additional sources of illumination of air targets.

In October 2003, Roke Manor Research demonstrated a version of the Celldar passive radar system (short for Cellular phone radar) to the leadership of the British Ministry of Defense during military exercises at the Salisbury Plain training ground. The cost of a demonstration prototype, consisting of two conventional parabolic antennas, two mobile phones(acting as "cells") and a PC with an analog-to-digital converter amounted to a little more than 3 thousand dollars. As foreign experts believe, the military department of any country with a developed mobile telephone infrastructure is capable of creating such
nye radar systems. In this case, telephone network transmitters can be used without the knowledge of their operators. It will be possible to expand the capabilities of systems like Celldar through auxiliary tools, such as, for example, acoustic sensors.

Thus, the creation and adoption of multi-position radar systems of the Silent Sentry or Celldar type will allow the armed forces of the United States and its allies to solve qualitatively new tasks of covert surveillance and control of airspace in zones of possible armed conflicts in certain regions of the world. In addition, they can be involved in solving the problems of air traffic control, combating the spread of drugs, etc.

As the experience of wars of the last 15 years shows, traditional air defense systems have low noise immunity and survivability, primarily from the impact of high-precision weapons. Therefore, the disadvantages of active radar should be neutralized as much as possible by additional means - passive means of reconnaissance of targets at low and extremely low altitudes. The development of multi-position radar systems using the external radiation of various radio equipment was quite actively carried out in the USSR, especially in the last years of its existence. Currently, in a number of CIS countries, theoretical and experimental studies on the creation of MPRS are continuing. It should be noted that similar work in this area of ​​radar is being carried out by domestic specialists. In particular, an experimental bistatic radar "Pole" was created and successfully tested, where radio and television transmitting stations are used as target illumination transmitters.

LITERATURE

1. Jane's Defense Equipment (Electronic Library of Armaments of the Countries of the World), 2006 - 2007.

2. Peter B. Davenport. Using Multistatic Passive Radar for Real-Time Detection of UFO "S in the Near-Earth Environment. - Copyright 2004. - National UFO Reporting Center, Seattle, Washington .

3. H. D. Griffiths. Bistatic and Multistatic Radar. - University College London, Dept. Electronic and Electrical Engineering. Torrington Place, London WC1E 7JE, UK.

4 Jonathan Bamak, Dr. Gregory Baker, Ann Marie Cunningham, Lorraine Martin. Silent Sentry™ Passive Surveillance // Aviation Week&Space Technology. - June 7, 1999. - P.12.

5. Rare Access: http://www.roke.co/. uk/sensors/stealth/celldar.asp.

6. Karshakevich D. The phenomenon of the "Field" radar // Army. - 2005 - No. 1. - S. 32 - 33.

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