Crashed plane 2 years before the crash
Flight 9605 details
Airplane
| External images | |
|---|---|
| Board RA-65691 shortly before the crash | |
Tu-134A-3 ( registration number RA-65691, factory 63195, serial 57-03) was released by the Kharkov Aircraft Plant on April 29, 1980. On May 7, 1980, it was transferred to the Aeroflot airline (from May 7, 1980 to August 21, 1984 - MGA of the USSR, 235th Separate Representative JSC, from August 21, 1984 to August 1993 - MGA of the USSR, North Caucasian UGA, Volgograd OJSC). From March 1993 to August 4, 2000, it belonged to the Volga-Aviaexpress airline (from August 25, 1998 to August 4, 2000 it was in storage). On August 4, 2000, it was bought by the Kazan airline "Tatarstan", from which from February 28 to August 27, 2001 it was leased to the Cheboksary Autonomous District - Chuvashia. In March 2011, it was purchased by the RusAir airline. It is equipped with two double-circuit turbojet engines D-30-III of the Perm Motor Plant. On the day of the disaster, the liner made 20,977 take-off and landing cycles and flew 35,591 hours.
Crew and passengers
The aircraft was flown by an experienced crew, the composition of which was as follows:
- The aircraft commander (FAC) is 44-year-old Alexander Ivanovich Fedorov. Experienced Pilot, worked for RusAir for 3 months (since March 2011). He flew the Mi-8 helicopter and the An-2 aircraft. In the position of commander of the Tu-134 - since 2008 (before that he flew it as a co-pilot). He flew 8501 hours, 3158 of them on the Tu-134 (1627 of them as a PIC).
- The co-pilot is 40-year-old Sergey Nikolaevich Karyakin. Experienced pilot, worked for RusAir for 7 months (since November 2010). He flew the An-2 aircraft. Since April 2007, he has been the co-pilot of the Tu-134. He flew 2846 hours, 1099 of them on the Tu-134.
- Navigator-instructor - 50-year-old Amanberdy Ataev. Worked at RusAir for 10 months (since August 2010). As a navigator, he flew the An-24 aircraft. He has been a Tu-134 navigator since March 1985, and a Tu-134 navigator-instructor since 1997. He flew 13,699 hours, 13,464 of them on the Tu-134.
- Flight mechanic - 56-year-old Viktor Evgenievich Timoshenko. Worked for RusAir for 5 years (since July 2005). As a flight mechanic, he flew the Yak-40 aircraft. Since December 2001, he has been a Tu-134 flight mechanic. He flew 11,231 hours, 2,494 of them on the Tu-134.
Three flight attendants worked in the cabin of the aircraft:
- Yulia Sergeevna Gurina, 28 years old.
- Elena Nikolaevna Erofeeva, 27 years old.
- Yulia Sergeevna Skvortsova, 24 years old.
The crew also included aircraft technicians Alexander Alexandrovich Fedorchenko (44 years old) and Mikhail Nikitich Karpuk (57 years old).
In total, there were 52 people on board the aircraft - 43 passengers and 9 crew members. One of the passengers was FIFA referee Vladimir Pettai.
Chronology of events
Preceding circumstances
On June 17, 2011, the RusLine flight RLU-243, which was supposed to take place on June 20 of the same year on the Moscow-Petrozavodsk route, was replaced in accordance with the established procedure with the RusAir flight TsGI-9605 on June 20, 2011 on the Moscow-Petrozavodsk route. Petrozavodsk on a Tu-134A-3 aircraft, board RA-65691, on which passengers were accepted for all previously sold tickets. The aircraft was replaced due to the planned increase in passenger traffic on the Moscow-Petrozavodsk-Moscow route, in connection with which it was decided to increase the number of passenger seats on this flight from 50 to 66. RusLine Airlines carried out air transportation on Bombardier CRJ-100/200 aircraft in the layout of 50 seats (there were no Tu-134 aircraft in the fleet of RusLine Airlines). According to other sources, RusLine did not have enough aircraft for execution regular transportation, because flights have been replaced before. In addition, at the time of departure on 20.06.2011 for this flight 47 tickets were sold, and as of 06/17/2011 - 35 tickets, which did not indicate a sharp increase in passenger traffic.
Departure from Moscow
Flight TsGI-9605 took off from Domodedovo Airport at 22:30 MSK (18:30 UTC). The weather forecast for Petrozavodsk provided for: wind near the ground 120°, 4 m/s, visibility 3000 meters, sometimes worsening to 1500 meters, light rain, haze, significant cloudiness 5-7 oktas with a lower limit of 120 meters, sometimes 90 meters, overcast 8 oktants with a lower limit of 3000 meters. When transmitting weather data, the forecaster on duty at Petrozavodsk airport warned the commander of his intention to prepare a correction to the forecast, as he expected the weather to worsen in the airport area. According to the current regulations, changes in the weather forecast are transmitted to the crews at their request, which the crew of Flight 9605 did not make before takeoff, despite the departure delay by 20 minutes. The main part of the route from Moscow to Petrozavodsk, the flight TsGI-9605 flew at flight level 9100 meters.
Approach to Petrozavodsk
At 23:10, at the request of the crew, Petrozavodsk-Tower dispatcher Sergey Shmatkov transmitted to flight 9605 information about the actual weather of Petrozavodsk for 22:00: wind near the ground 80 °, 2 m/s, visibility 2100 m, overcast, at the main point 140 meters, on the short drive 200 meters, MKpos=12°. The actual weather did not correspond to the operational minimum of the aerodrome approved by the operator (RusAir), however, the PIC unreasonably continued the flight to the destination. After a full pre-landing preparation at 23:20 MSK, the crew began to descend.
At 23:28, the crew lowered the liner to 4500 meters and received permission to descend to the transition level of 1500 meters. At 23:30, the actual weather was reported to the crew: calm, visibility 2100 meters, haze, continuous clouds, 130 meters at the main observation point (OPN), 170 meters at the BPM. Flight 9605 was on approach on a heading of 12° in low cloud and poor visibility, while deviating from its intended vertical descent profile and landing course. At that moment at the airport of Petrozavodsk, according to official meteorological observations, the height of the lower boundary of the clouds (VNGO) was 120-150 meters, the visibility range was 2100-2500 meters. The minimum (minimum descent height × visibility range) of the Petrozavodsk aerodrome, indicated by the airport in NOTAM, for civil aircraft of class C, D according to the OSP (the main landing system - far and near locating radio beacons) with fixing the point of entry into the glide path , was with a landing course of 012 110 ×2100 m. At the same time, the officially observed weather (120×2100 m) did not correspond to the operational minimum of Petrozavodsk Airport (165×3500 m) approved by the operator, and according to the Federal Aviation Rules "Preparation and performance of flights in civil aviation Russian Federation"(FAR-128) did not give the PIC the right to descend and approach. However, in violation of FAR-128, the crew was guided by the minimum specified in the NOTAM.
At 23:32, at an altitude of 2700 meters, the PIC turned off the autopilot on the side channel and subsequently carried out piloting in manual mode. At 23:33, the crew reported the altitude (1500 meters), set the airport pressure, set ARC No. 1 and No. 2 to LBM and BBM and continued to descend to 900 meters. At 23:35 the crew received permission to descend to 500 meters. After completing the fourth turn, the aircraft ended up four kilometers to the left of runway No. 01 of the Petrozavodsk airport. The start point of the fourth turn entered into the system was at a distance of 1.6 km from the runway, while the required lead for the start of the turn is 3-3.2 km. The exit from the turn with lateral deviation was also facilitated by the southeast wind up to 9 m/s. After exiting the turn with lateral deviation in order to enter the runway alignment, the navigator gave the command to the commander to perform a turn to the right on the course of 30°.
decline
At 23:36, at the command of the PIC, the flight mechanic released the landing gear. At 23:36:40 the navigator reported that the runway was 21 kilometers away and the aircraft was 2.3 km to the left of the runway alignment. At 23:37:28 the controller informed the crew about the removal of 18 km from the runway and the aircraft being on the landing course. At 23:37:35 the commander took a course of 15° (taking into account the left drift angle of 3°). At the command of the PIC, the flight mechanic proceeded to extend the flaps first at 20° and then at 30°. At the end of the flaps extension, the navigator informed about the distance of 500 meters to the TVG and the aircraft being strictly in the alignment of the runway. When extending the flaps, the flight altitude of Flight 9605 increased from 500 to 550 meters due to the fact that the PIC did not timely compensate for the increase in wing lift when extending the flaps by deflecting the helm column " Push».
After the information from the navigator that the aircraft was at the point of entry into the glide path, the PIC, maintaining a magnetic heading of 16°, began to descend from a height of 550 meters at a speed of 290-300 km/h with a calculated vertical rate of descent of 4 m/s. After the report of the co-pilot about the readiness for landing, the controller gave the go-ahead for landing and said that the plane was 8 kilometers from the airport. At 23:38:54, the navigator informed the commander of the need to increase the heading by 3° in order to compensate for drift due to the presence of a side wind from the right. Due to the entrance to the glide path at an altitude of 550 meters while maintaining the vertical speed calculated for entering the glide path at an altitude of 500 meters, the liner passed the LPM at an altitude of 385 meters, 55 meters higher than the specified one. After the flight of the LBM, at the command of the navigator, given in order to correct the trajectory of movement, the commander increased the vertical rate of descent to 6 m/s.
At 23:39:21 the navigator determined the drift angle of 5° to the left and gave the command: Left 5 demolition, on this course we go, do not take the left. At 23:39:35 the navigator reported: Removal 4, control 220, while vertical 6 meters. With a further decrease at a height of 150-200 meters, the wind weakened and the drift decreased. The commander continued to keep the course 17 °, which led to a deviation to the right from the given trajectory. Since the navigator maintained the direction according to the data of the KLN-90В satellite navigation system, not taking into account the indications of the ARC, the aircraft deviation to the right of the runway axis was unnoticed by the crew.
At an altitude of 150 meters and 3 kilometers from the runway, the aircraft crossed the specified descent glide path, to maintain which it was necessary to set the vertical rate of descent of 4 m/s, while the vertical rate maintained by the PIC continued to be about 5-5.5 m/s. With. With a further descent at a height of 140 m (the height of the beginning of the visual assessment) and 110 m (the height of the decision), in violation of the work technology of the crew members, the navigator did not give the command " Grade" And " VLOOKUP". But instead of go-around, the PIC continued to descend below the VLR without establishing visual contact with the approach lights and ground references. The co-pilot, in the presence of a vertical speed of more than 5 m/s at an altitude of less than 100 meters, did not give a command steep decline. From a height of 70 meters, the flight mechanic began counting the altitude using a radio altimeter every 10 meters.
At 23:40:02 the navigator gave the command: Removal two, score. The ratio of the height and removal of the liner from the runway indicated that the aircraft was significantly below the specified descent trajectory. However, the crew continued to descend with the same vertical speed. At the command of the navigator Grade"The commander, without transferring control to the co-pilot, proceeded to establish contact with ground landmarks, as a result of which control over the parameters of the aircraft's descent was lost, which contributed to the development of the right bank and maintaining an increased vertical speed.
Catastrophe
At an altitude of 60 meters, a ground proximity alarm was triggered, in which the PIC is obliged to immediately start a go-around. At 23:40:05 the FAC reported: I don't see it yet. I'm watching but did not announce his decision. The co-pilot, who was obliged in this case to initiate a go-around, also did not do so. At 23:40:08 the navigator reported about the removal of 1.5 kilometers at the same time as the flight mechanic counted the height of 50 meters. The aircraft, being significantly below the glide path, continued to deviate to the right with a roll of 5-6 °. Crew control of altitude, rate of descent, roll and heading was lost as all crew members attempted to establish visual contact with ground references. However, the actual meteorological conditions during the landing approach in the LBM and BBM area (low stratus clouds 30-40 meters high, turning into fog with a visibility of 500-700 meters) did not allow the crew to establish visual contact with ground references until the aircraft collided with trees. The crew made no attempts to stop the descent and start a go-around until the collision.
At 23:40:12 MSK, 2 seconds after the flight mechanic's count of 40 meters, the aircraft began to collide with trees. The first touch of the trees (pine tops 25 meters high) occurred at a distance of 1260 meters from the runway at a height of 32 meters at a speed of 280 km/h. Simultaneously with the collision with a tree, the PIC deflected the steering wheel to the stop to the stop, creating an angle of attack up to supercritical. The right roll due to the destruction of the end of the right half-wing began to increase vigorously. Continuing to collide with trees, the flight TsGI-9605 with a developing right bank flew another 510 meters from the site of the first collision with trees and crashed into the parapet of the road at the intersection of highway A133 Petrozavodsk-Suoyarvi and turning to the airport in an almost inverted position (roll over 90 °) and with a pitch angle of at least −10° (dive). The liner began to collapse, caught fire, furrowed about 150 meters along the ground and stopped 1.2 kilometers from Petrozavodsk airport and only 20 meters from residential buildings in the village of Besovets. At 425 meters from the site of the first collision with trees, the aircraft crossed the power line leading to the BPRM and cut off the wires. This caused a short-term (for 5 seconds) shutdown of the lighting equipment system with low-intensity lights. The aircraft was completely destroyed and caught fire.
The accident occurred at the point of coordinates 61°52′10″ s. sh. 34°08′53″ in. d. HGIOL .
Transcript of negotiations
| 23:36:07 | PC | Lateral left 4 go bye. |
| 23:36:12 | PC | Removal of 23 kilometers. |
| 23:36:14 | 2P | TsGI 96-0-5, occupied 500. |
| 23:36:16 | Di | TsGI 96-0-5, distance 24, to the left of the landing, 500 to the entrance to the glide path. |
| 23:36:28 | bm | The chassis is being released. |
| 23:36:30 | PC | Total 21, we are approaching the course. |
| 23:36:41 | PC | Here the entry point is 10, to the left of 2 and 3, we approach the course. |
| 23:37:05 | PC | To the left is a kilometer and 200 meters. |
| 23:37:08 | PC | 7 kilometers to entry point. |
| 23:37:14 | 2P | Come on 20 flaps (nrzb). |
| 23:37:16 | FAC | 370 speed withstand. |
| 23:37:19 | Di | TsGI 96-0-5, removal 18, on the landing course. |
| 23:37:25 | PC | (nrzb) 500, we take the boarding pass, 15 e ... take it for now. |
| 23:37:30 | PC | Left 3 demolition. |
| 23:37:36 | PC | Well, yes, so it would be, until 15 withdraw. |
| 23:37:41 | PC | We go 200 meters to the left. |
| 23:37:44 | PC | 4 kilometers to the point. |
| 23:37:46 | FAC | Flaps 20. |
| 23:37:57 | PC | Left 3 demolition, on this course. |
| 23:37:59 | bm | 20 released. |
| 23:38:03 | PC | 2 kilometers to entry point. |
| 23:38:04 | FAC | Flaps 30. |
| 23:38:15 | bm | 30 released. |
| 23:38:16 | PC | (nrzb) 500 meters to the point, strictly on the line right now. |
| 23:38:20 | Di | TsGI 96-0-5, removal 11, on the course, approach the glide path. |
| 23:38:25 | 2P | We are approaching the glide path, keeping the TsGI 96-0-5, 500. |
| 23:38:28 | PC | Entry point 10 and 4, descending, vertical 4 meters. |
| 23:38:31 | FAC | Map control. |
| 23:38:47 | PC | Control is over. |
| 23:38:49 | 2P | TsGI 96-0-5, descending, ready for landing. |
| 23:38:54 | PC | Right 3 course. |
| 23:38:56 | Di | TsGI 96-0-5, removal 8, on the landing course, landing clear. |
| 23:39:03 | 2P | TsGI 96-0-5, landing cleared, long flight. |
| 23:39:10 | PC | Removal of 6 kilometers, (nrzb) vertical 5 meters. |
| 23:39:11 | 2P | Landing approved. |
| 23:39:14 | FAC | I hold 5, we go a little higher, right? |
| 23:39:16 | PC | Yes, we are going higher, 6 meters vertical. |
| 23:39:21 | PC | So, to the left 5 demolition, we are going on this course, do not take it to the left. |
| 23:39:24 | FAC | Fine. |
| 23:39:34 | PC | Removal 4, control 220, while 6 meters. |
| 23:39:48 | PC | Yes, let's go to this course. |
| 23:39:50 | PC | Removal 3, 150 on the glide path. |
| 23:40:02 | PC | Removal 2, score. |
| 23:40:04 | bm | 60. |
| 23:40:05 | FAC | I don't see it yet. |
| 23:40:07 | FAC | I'm watching. |
| 23:40:08 | PC | (nrzb) one and a half kilometers. |
| 23:40:10 | bm | 40 meters. |
| 23:40:12 | The sound of hitting a pine tree. | |
| 23:40:13 | 2P | Yo ... t ... yu mother !!! |
| 23:40:14 | E | (nrzb). |
| 23:40:14 | End of record. |
Rescue operation
One of the surviving passengers was able to get out of the plane on his own. locals dragged some of the victims away from the burning debris. The first fire engine (from the airport), according to the director of the airport, arrived at the crash site in a minute and a half. The people who saved the survivors were later awarded medals.
Victims and injured
There were 52 people on board flight 9605 - 43 passengers (among them 8 children) and 9 crew members. The plane crash killed 44 people - 36 passengers (among them 7 children) and 8 crew members (all four pilots, both aircraft technicians and two flight attendants). 8 people survived, but were injured, including one flight attendant and one child. The condition of seven of the eight survivors was described by doctors as "extremely serious." The Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation sent an Il-76 aircraft equipped with medical modules to Karelia to evacuate the victims. On board the plane were 15 doctors from the Centrospas detachment and five psychologists. The next day, one of the survivors, a nine-year-old child, died in the Children's Republican Hospital of Karelia; thus, the number of victims increased to 45 people. On June 25, another surviving passenger died in the hospital, and another survivor died later in the day. The number of victims of the disaster has increased to 47 people.
| A country | dead | Affected |
|---|---|---|
| 38 | 5 | |
| / |
For decades of operation on the territory of the USSR and the post-Soviet space, TU-134 aircraft have established themselves as a reliable and trouble-free aircraft. However, there were no accidents. The crashes of TU-134 occurred for various objective and subjective reasons, and they were united by one thing - human sacrifice. Some of them gave impetus to the gradual withdrawal of this model from service in civil aviation and their replacement with more modern vessels.
Becomes uneasy at the mere mention of major air crashes. The most resonant crashes were the following accidents:
- The crash of the TU-134 aircraft near Minsk.
- Accident in Ivanovo.
- The fall of TU-134 in Kuibyshev.
- Plane crash in Samara.
- The fall of the TU-134 during takeoff in the Crimea.
Tragedy near Petrozavodsk
The TU-134 crash near Petrozavodsk occurred on June 20, 2011, and it was it that laid the foundation for the decommissioning of TU-134 aircraft in Russia.
While landing, the aircraft hit trees and crashed to the ground. Most of the passengers died in the crash. This catastrophe became the largest in the territory of the Republic of Karelia. Experts will later name the main reason for the erroneous actions of the aircraft crew, who refused to take the liner to the second round in order to avoid a crash in conditions of lack of visibility. runway.
In addition, the ship's navigator, who was intoxicated at the time of the flight, took the initiative in making critical decisions. The dispatcher of the Petrozavodsk airport several times tried to convince the crew not to land, but to no avail. Another prerequisite for the tragedy was an incorrect weather forecast transmitted to the crew by the airport meteorological service. Not the last role was played by the obsolete technical equipment of the aircraft.
A memorial was erected at the crash site in memory of the victims of the tragedy, seven victims received compensation. As a result of legal proceedings, the official of the Federal Air Transport Agency Eduard Voitovsky, the head of the Petrozavodsk airport and the head of the airport's meteorological service, were found guilty.
Crash of TU-134 near Minsk
February 1, 1985 happened major disaster TU-134 near Minsk. Almost after the takeoff of the plane en route Minsk - Leningrad, both engines failed in turn, as a result of which the plane crashed in the forest. Of the 80 people on board, 22 survived. The investigation of the incident led to the conclusion that the crew members were not at fault in this incident. The question of how both engines of the aircraft fell into disrepair remained controversial. TU-134 of 1977 was in excellent condition at that time.
As a result of the check, ice ingress into the engines was recognized as a possible cause, which led to their surge and destruction.
It was not possible to reliably confirm this version, since the ice that may have got into the engines melted at the time of the accident. Subsequent experiments with engines of this model nevertheless confirmed the version with ice entering the engine inlets, but did not reveal the cause of possible glaciation.
Tragedy in Ivanovo
The TU-134 crash in Ivanovo happened on August 27, 1992, when the plane was landing. The ship crashed on non-residential buildings in the village of Lebyazhy Lug near the airport.
No one was injured among the residents of the village, but all passengers and crew members on board the aircraft died in a matter of seconds. The causes of the terrible tragedy can be called uncoordinated actions of the aircraft crew and violations of the rules of flight and landing. After the command of the airport controller to descend, the aircraft banked to the right and left the airway.
The ship's commander attempted to bring the aircraft out of the roll and perform a maneuver, listing the liner to the left. As a result of the resulting overloads, the ship did not have time to prepare for a safe landing, however, the commander insisted on continuing the descent without go-around. One of the aircraft's wings touched the trees, causing it to fall and collide with non-residential buildings. It was they who saved the inhabitants of the nearby houses of the village from a possible entry into the list of victims of the disaster. In fact, in this case, the main cause of the tragedy was the human factor.
Plane crash in Kuibyshev
One of the most ridiculous for its own reason, but major tragedies is the crash of TU-134 in Kuibyshev, which occurred on October 20, 1986.
The aircraft, while making an intermediate landing at Kurumoch airport, descended at high speed, due to which the landing gear broke on the runway, the ship slipped on the ground, broke in two, and started a fire. 70 people died.
The cause of the tragedy was a dispute between the commander of the aircraft and the rest of the crew on the subject of whether the first could land the ship blindly. Alexander Klyuev, the commander of the ship, limited his visibility with a curtain on the cockpit window and in this position began to descend. The co-pilot flew without a curtain, but did not warn his colleague about the possible danger and did not make a proposal to enter the ship on the second circle.
After the fall, he actively helped passengers get out of the car engulfed in flames and died of a heart attack on the way to the hospital. Alexander Klyuev was subsequently charged. He was sentenced to 15 years, of which he spent six years in prison and was released after a review of the case. So negligence and gambling in the workplace led to death a large number of people.
Accident involving TU-134 in Samara
Like many previous incidents, the TU-134 crash in Samara occurred at the time of the landing approach.
Due to sharply deteriorated weather conditions and the lack of visibility of the runway lights, the aircraft deviated from the course. The air traffic controller at Kurumoch Airport informed the crew about this, however, he did so untimely and in insufficient detail for an objective assessment of the situation. The crew of the ship did not consider it necessary to take the ship to the second circle, as a result of which the aircraft landed off the runway. The landing gear could not withstand the load and gave way, and the plane itself fell on its side, and its front part broke off from the fuselage. Six of the 57 people on board were killed.
The commander of the ship and the co-pilot, who were sentenced to 4 and 2 years of probation, were found guilty of the incident. Also, the situation was predetermined by shortcomings in the regulatory documentation in the work of the airport dispatch service, which did not allow the dispatcher to timely transmit to the crew information about the deterioration of weather conditions and the extent of the deviation of the aircraft from the landing course.
On July 10, 2006, the Tu-134 crashed during takeoff. The plane was supposed to follow the flight Simferopol - Moscow. When picking up speed during the takeoff run, a bird suddenly hit the ship's engine. The crew of the ship urgently decided to stop the flight. The plane began emergency braking, but taking into account the mass of the vessel, adjusted for the mass of the full refueling, it was not possible to stop it immediately.
The car rolled out of the runway, where it hit the landing gear in a ravine and broke in half. Fuel leaked from under the destroyed right wing plane caught fire. Fortunately, none of the passengers were hurt. The ship itself was written off after the damage received. Another good moment was that the crew of the ship managed to take the plane away from the airport buildings, avoiding casualties.
This is only an incomplete list of accidents involving the Tu-134 aircraft. Their number seems large in comparison with the Vickers Viscount aircraft, the only accident involving which occurred in 1960 near Moscow. It is difficult to identify patterns that predetermine crashes. Each such case occurs due to an individual set of factors and is then carefully investigated. Some examples of critical factors include:
- Sharply deteriorated weather- an objective reason, the occurrence of which is sometimes not possible to predict.
- The human factor is a set of erroneous actions, wrong decisions made in a critical situation, criminal negligence that precedes a tragedy. It is also very difficult to prevent these events.
- Aircraft technical malfunction. As in the case of the crash near Minsk, this factor is not related to the negligence of the crew. Finding the causes of problems after an accident is not always possible due to significant damage to the hull and engines.
However, aircraft were and remain one of the safe species transport, where accidents are rather a rare exception to the rule. TU-134 contributed to the development of civil and military aviation The USSR and Russia can rightfully be considered worthy representatives of aviation shipbuilding.
In contact with
Tu-134 plane crash near Syktyvkar the accident that occurred on July 2, 1982 with the Tu-134AK aircraft of Aeroflot airlines, following the flight Vorkuta - Syktyvkar - Moscow. Due to the fire, the liner committed forced landing into the forest and crashed. 54 people died.
Events
In the summer of 1982, the Tu-134AK airliner flew Vorkuta - Syktyvkar - Moscow under the control of the crew of the 75th Aeroflot flight squad. At Vorkuta airport, all luggage was loaded into the rear luggage compartment, while his examination was not carried out, which was allowed by the instructions. The plane arrived in Syktyvkar without incident and was preparing to leave for Moscow. 5 more passengers got on board. In total, there were 86 people on the plane, including 19 children.
At 09.55 Moscow time, the liner left the Syktyvkar airport and began climbing. When, after 15 minutes, the plane was already 140 kilometers from the airport and gained an altitude of 6700 meters, the commander reported to the dispatcher about the fire and proceeded to an emergency descent with a turn back to Syktyvkar.
The plane quickly descended to a height of 1000 meters. The cabin quickly filled with smoke. The crew members who tried to put out the fire failed and returned to the cockpit. Soon, the crew commander told the dispatchers that he was preparing for emergency landing outside the airport. When the plane dropped to 300 meters, the radars lost it.
By this time, some of the passengers had already lost their creation due to smoke poisoning. For 9 minutes, the crew tried to find a landing site, but due to the low flight altitude with limited visibility (6 kilometers), they did not succeed. Taking into account the heavy smoke, the commander was forced to make a decision to carry out an emergency landing directly on the mixed forest located under them, without preparing the aircraft and passengers for an emergency evacuation.
At 10:27, 75 kilometers southwest of Syktyvkar, a Tu-134 flying at an altitude of 23-25 meters above the ground collided with the tops of trees and rushed through the forest, collapsing. At the same time, the navigator immediately died, who remained at his workplace in the nose of the aircraft. After 195 meters from the place of the first impact, the airliner touched the ground, and after 25 meters both wing panels were torn off. Having rushed along the ground 145 meters, the fuselage of the aircraft, destroyed into three parts, stopped. Fuel leaking from the damaged fuel tanks ignited and a ground fire broke out, partially destroying the aircraft.
Passengers evacuated on their own through the service door of the front luggage compartment, the cockpit window and fuselage fractures, while the flight attendants, meanwhile, helped the pilots and the flight mechanic to get out.
At 13:35, the crash site was found by a rescue helicopter, and at about 19:00, the survivors were evacuated. In total, 45 adult passengers, 7 children, a navigator and a flight mechanic died in the crash (he died of wounds). The remaining 38 survivors (22 adult passengers, 12 children, pilots and flight attendants) received various injuries.
Air crash investigation
In general, the investigation of the IAC commission lasted 5 months, while fifty additional studies were carried out in various research institutes and organizations. So for ground tests at the airport of Yerevan, Tu-134A board 65657 was even burned.
According to data obtained from the black boxes of the planes, it turned out that 10 minutes after takeoff, the crew received a signal “Dim in the rear trunk”. The flight mechanic went to check the signal, but when he confirmed this, the crew commander decided to make sure personally. As a result, another 4 minutes were lost, during which the plane moved further away from the airport and climbed to a height of 6700 meters.
While the commander was turning the plane back to the airport, the co-pilot and the flight mechanic tried to put out the fire, but the smoke was so strong that they could not cope and returned to the cockpit to help with the landing.
There is a main version of the cause of the fire:
ignition of a self-igniting substance or liquid prohibited for transportation in passengers' luggage with subsequent penetration of the burning liquid into the underground space or ignition of the insulation of electric wires soaked in flammable liquid in the luggage compartment
And an alternate version:
Among those who sat down in Syktyvkar 5 additional passengers there were 2 people who worked in Komi as lumberjacks. They took with them to hand luggage chainsaw "Ural". There is a version that this chainsaw was put aside in the rear luggage compartment and it was the gasoline in its gas tank that could ignite.
During an emergency landing and subsequent fire, the aircraft was almost completely destroyed and the exact causes of the fire could not be determined.
44 people on the plane, and three of the eight injured later died in hospitals.
Flight attendant Yulia Skvortsova, Muscovites Sergei Eremin, Sergei Belgesov and Alexandra Kargopolova, and Sakhalin schoolgirl Anastasia Terekhina managed to survive.
On June 20, 2011, a regular flight on the route Domodedovo - Petrozavodsk - Domodedovo on a CRJ-100/200 aircraft was to be operated by ZAO AK RusLine. But due to the large passenger traffic, the RusLine company was forced to cancel the regular flight, instead it was operated chartered flight on a Tu-134 aircraft operated by RusAir (now Atlas Jet).
The Tu-134 plane took off from Domodedovo (Moscow) at 22.30 Moscow time and was supposed to land at the Besovets airport in Petrozavodsk at 00.04 Moscow time.
However, in conditions of poor visibility, when landing on the runway of the Petrozavodsk airfield, to the right and below the specified descent trajectory, the plane crashed onto the Petrozavodsk-Suoyarvi highway. While landing at a speed of about 290 kilometers per hour, the plane hit the trees on the sides of the road and rolled over to starboard. The first collision of the aircraft with trees occurred at 23.40 Moscow time.
Having flown another 510 meters, the liner collided with the parapet of the road almost in an inverted position (a roll of more than 90 degrees), collapsed and caught fire. While moving, the plane damaged trees on a stretch of about 500 meters, broke the power line.
The fire that broke out at the place where the aircraft stopped led to the destruction of most of the fuselage skin and the complete burnout of the passenger cabin of the aircraft. Fragments of the plane were scattered almost 300 meters.
The first at the crash site were ordinary people who were driving at that time along the Petrozavodsk-Suoyarvi highway, and residents of the nearby holiday village. The plane crashed just 200 meters from residential buildings. They assisted people until the arrival of doctors.
Rescue teams and firefighters arrived 15 minutes later. In total, to eliminate the consequences of the disaster and 58 units of equipment, including from the Russian Emergencies Ministry - 218 people and 30 units of equipment. Was held big job for the rescue and evacuation of the victims, the extraction of the bodies of the victims from the destroyed aircraft, their identification and transfer to relatives for burial. As a result of the rescue work, eight people were rescued and evacuated from the crash site to hospitals in Petrozavodsk, three of whom subsequently died in hospitals.
On June 23, the leadership of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia, commemorative watches and uniforms of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of nine residents of Karelia and three firefighters who participated in the rescue of victims of a plane crash near Petrozavodsk. Seven of them were awarded medals "For Courage in a Fire", five - "For Distinction in Eliminating the Consequences of an Emergency".
Insurance payments were determined, which were to be paid by the airline "Rusair", the relatives of the dead - two million rubles, and the injured - one million rubles. In addition, the government of Karelia decided to allocate one million rubles to the relatives of the victims, and 500 thousand rubles to the victims.
On the fact of a hard landing of Tu-134 aircraft in Karelia, a criminal case was initiated under Article 263 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of traffic safety rules and operation of railway, air or water transport), which provides for a maximum sentence of up to seven years.
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) has published a report on the Tu-134 crash near Petrozavodsk.
The cause of the crash of the Tu-134 aircraft during the aircraft landing approach in conditions worse than the meteorological minimums of the airfield was the crew's failure to make a decision to go around and the aircraft descending below the established minimum safe altitude in the absence of visual contact with the approach lights and ground references, which led to to the collision of the aircraft with trees and the ground in controlled flight.
In addition, the crew was given an incorrect weather forecast in Petrozavodsk, and the navigator was in a state of mild alcohol intoxication.
One of the factors contributing to the disaster was the management of resources by the captain of the ship during the landing approach, expressed in "subordination of the activities of the commander of the aircraft to the navigator, who is highly active and in a mild degree of alcohol intoxication, and the actual elimination of the co-pilot from the control loop of the aircraft at the final stage of the emergency flight," the IAC said in a statement.
The materials of the case against the official of the Federal Air Transport Agency and two employees of the airport, who are the defendants in the case of the Tu-134 crash in Karelia, were separated into a separate proceeding.
The Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation has completed a criminal investigation into the crash of a Tu-134 aircraft near Petrozavodsk. Airport employees Vladimir Shkarupa and Vladimir Pronin were charged with violating the rules of traffic safety and operation of air transport, and Eduard Voitovsky, head of the radio technical support for flights and aviation telecommunications of the Federal Air Transport Agency, was charged with negligence. The case against the accused was sent with an indictment to the Prosecutor General's Office.
Yulia Skvortsova, who worked on this flight as a flight attendant, was injured and extensively burned, underwent three surgeries and then was hospitalized for a long time, filed a lawsuit with the Tverskoy Court of Moscow against RusAir and the insurance company in which she was insured as an employee .
The Tverskoy Court of Moscow ruled to recover one million rubles from the airline as compensation to stewardess Yulia Skvortsova.
A memorial was opened at the crash site near Petrozavodsk in memory of the victims of the plane crash. The author of the project of the memorial complex was the Karelian artist Alexander Kim. The monument consists of three parts: the tail of the aircraft, the explosion from the fall and the stele with a symbolic image of 47 birds flying into the sky. At the memorial complex there are cast-iron plates with the names of all the victims of the plane crash.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources
